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PAFRAS Briefing Papers 
 
PAFRAS (Positive Action for Refugees and Asylum 
Seekers) is an independent organisation based in 
Leeds. By working directly with asylum seekers and 
refugees it has consistently adapted to best meet 
and respond to the needs of some of the most 
marginalised people in society. Consequently, 
recognising the growing severity of destitution 
policies, in 2005 PAFRAS opened a ‘drop-in’ 
providing food parcels, hot meals, clothes, and 
toiletries. Simultaneously experienced case 
workers offer one-to-one support and give free 
information and assistance; primarily to destitute 
asylum seekers. PAFRAS works to promote social 
justice through a combination of direct assistance, 
individual case work, and research based 
interventions and analysis. 
 
Below an underclass, destitute asylum seekers 
exist not even on the periphery of society; denied 
access to the world around them and forced into a 
life of penury. To be a destitute asylum seeker is to 
live a life of indefinite limbo that is largely invisible, 
and often ignored. It is also a life of fear; fear of 
detention, exploitation, and deportation.  
 
It is from the experiences of those who are forced 
into destitution that PAFRAS briefing papers are 
drawn. All of the individual cases referred to stem 
from interviews or conversations with people who 
use the PAFRAS drop-in, and are used with their 
consent. As such, insight is offered into a corner of 
society that exists beyond the reach of mainstream 
provision. Drawing from these perspectives, 
PAFRAS briefing papers provide concise analyses 
of key policies and concerns relating to those who 
are rendered destitute through the asylum process. 
In doing so, the human impacts of destitution 
policies are emphasised. 
 
Briefing Paper 8 
 
PAFRAS Briefing Paper 8 focuses on routes of 
return for asylum seekers whose claims have been 
refused. Since coming into power the New Labour 
government have placed considerable emphasis 
on returning refused asylum seekers – forcibly or 
otherwise. Ensuring that the number of removals of 
refused asylum seekers is greater than what are 
classed as ‘unfounded’ asylum applications is 
described as ‘performance improvement’.1 And as 
has been well documented, in 2006 one person 
                                                 
1
 Home Office (2006) Public performance target: removing 
more failed asylum seekers than new anticipated unfounded 
applications, London: Home Office. 
 
 
(not exclusively those seeking asylum) was 
deported every 8 minutes.2  
 
These removal policies have been implemented, 
frequently, in the face of warnings from NGOs, 
lawyers, independent experts and even the 
UNHCR that deportations may well lead to torture 
and severe injury. That this ‘deportation machine’3 
is often violent, dehumanising, and harmful has 
been made clear by at least two comprehensive 
reports in the last few years.4 What this briefing 
paper here places emphasis on, however, is the 
way in which a range of directives and initiatives 
have been instigated in order to respond to those 
who, for one reason or another, cannot return to 
their country if their asylum claim is refused. Whilst 
there have been significant efforts to draw attention 
to the governments use of destitution as an ‘end of 
process’ policy, there has been less focusing on 
the instruments which are put in place alongside 
this in order to ensure a way of returning people. 
These polices create a returns mechanism that 
utilises a myriad number of techniques in order to 
ensure that ‘refused’ asylum seekers can be 
removed from the country even where legal and 
outside opinion may categorically claim that the 
consequences (for those removed) may well be 
fatal. 
 
No direction home begins by analysing the 
contradiction in policy between the designation of 
countries as unsafe for return, and the level of 
support for those who cannot, consequently, be 
returned. It goes on to look at the context within 
which the government categorises countries as 
‘safe’ to return; despite overwhelming arguments to 
the contrary. In doing so, attention turns to the use 
of memorandums of understanding between the 
UK and particular states in order to legitimise 
removal policies. It finally considers the role of the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) in 
returns policies; placing emphasis upon both the 
role of the organisation in administering  
                                                 
2
 Home Office (2007) ‘Asylum applications continue to fall’, 
Home Office Press Release, 21 August, 
http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/press-releases/asylum-
applications?version=1  
3
 Fekete, L. (2005) The Deportation Machine: Europe, 
asylum, and human rights, London: Institute of Race 
Relations. 
4
 As well as Liz Fekete’s ‘Deportation Machine’ it is 
important to further take on board Birnberg Peirce & Partners, 
Medical Justice and the National Coalition of Anti-
Deportation Campaigns (2008) Outsourcing abuse: The use 
and misuse of state-sanctioned force during the detention and 
removal of asylum seekers, London: Birnberg Peirce & 
Partners, Medical Justice and the National Coalition of Anti-
Deportation Campaigns. 
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removals, and its role in ensuring that support is 
granted to those who cannot leave the country. 
 
No safe route of return? 
 
In November 2008 a legal ruling was made that 
Zimbabwean asylum seekers, whose claims have 
been refused, may nevertheless be able to access 
temporary support in the UK. Given the political 
situation in the country, courts ruled that 
Zimbabweans who are unable to show their loyalty 
to the ruling regime are likely to face ill-treatment if 
they are returned. Systematic human abuses in 
Zimbabwe, and the countries near economic 
collapse, have been well documented across the 
globe. With virtually no medical provision 
remaining, outbreaks of cholera are increasing and 
in July 2008, inflation was reported to have risen to 
2,200,000%. Thus, due to the severe deterioration 
in conditions in the country the November 2008 
ruling ensured that there was a possibility that 
those seeking asylum may be able to receive 
humanitarian protection.5 This glimmer of hope for 
refused Zimbabweans, however, is the latest stage 
in a saga of legal battling between the government 
and the judiciary which cuts right to the heart of the 
politics of asylum removal polices. Courts 
prevented the government from forcing removals in 
2002, only for them to resume in 2004. In 2005 
however, removals were again suspended and 
since this point the government has put significant 
levels of effort into attempting to resume 
deportations. In December this year Gordon Brown 
asserted that ‘enough is enough’ with regard to 
Zimbabwe: Continuing to claim that ‘there is no 
state capable or willing of protecting its people’.6 
The irony, as many have pointed out with regard to 
the UK and Zimbabwean asylum seekers, is cruel. 
As Frances Webber has discussed, ‘thousands of 
Zimbabweans have been living…in complete 
destitution’, because the Home Office has 
maintained that it is safe to return voluntarily, as 
opposed to forcible deportation.7 A policy that was 
described by one refused asylum seeker as 
evidence of ‘starving the victims of human rights 
abuses’.8 And earlier in 2008, the (then) Border and 
Immigration Agency (what is now the UK Borders 
Agency) specifically contacted refused  
                                                 
5
 See Webber, F. (2008) ‘Hope for Zimbabwean Asylum 
seekers’, IRR News Online, 27 November, 
http://www.irr.org.uk/2008/november/ha000030.html  
6
 Blessing-Miles, T. (2008) ‘Sentamu is wrong about 
Zimbabwe’, Guardian Online, 8 December,  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/dec/08/zimba
bwe-robert-mugabe  
7
 Webber, F. op. cit. 
8
 Interview with author, July 2008. 
 
 
Zimbabwean asylum seekers in an attempt to 
persuade them to return home voluntarily.9 In 2004 
– a year when there were 2,065 applications for 
asylum in the UK from Zimbabweans – there were 
2,310 refusals of asylum.10 Whilst a small 
proportion of these applicants were granted some 
form of leave to remain, the vast majority were 
refused. It can only be assumed that the higher 
number of refusals than applications refers to 
negative decisions being made on claims that were 
made prior to that year.  
 
British asylum policy in relation to Zimbabwe has 
been subjected to significant and sustained 
criticism from campaigners and activists, and it 
provides a focal reminder of the contradictions 
within British policies of return. These 
contradictions have manifested, and continue to 
manifest themselves in a variety of ways. Perhaps 
most visibly though they can be witnessed through 
the designation of countries as ‘safe’ to return to, 
despite significant evidence to the contrary. The 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), for example, 
has been the subject of fierce legal debate for a 
number of years and on the surface, this has 
focused on whether refused asylum seekers will be 
subjected to ill-treatment or not if returned.  
 
In August 2007 removals were suspended after 
evidence emerged of the torture and rape of 
returnees; but were resumed soon after following a 
series of legal challenges, made through the 
Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (AIT). And whilst 
removals were temporarily suspended again for a 
short period in November 2008, the AIT ruled on 3 
December that deportations could recommence 
once more: a decision that was made just 6 days 
after a group of former world leaders had called for 
an EU force to enter the DRC to stop ‘the greatest 
loss of life on the face of the earth’.11 The conflict in 
the DRC has been described by the International 
Rescue Committee (IRC) as the deadliest since the 
Second World War – claiming an estimate of 5.4 
million casualties over the last decade.12   
                                                 
9
 The use of voluntary return programmes as a coercive 
instrument of return has been well documented, and will be 
briefly discussed on page 6 of this paper. 
10
 Information Centre about Asylum and Refugees (2006) 
Zimbabwean asylum applications to the UK 1990-2005, 
London: Information Centre about Asylum and Refugees. 
11
 Borger, J. (2008) ‘Tutu and De Klerk plead with EU leaders 
to send force to Congo’, Guardian Online, 27 November, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/27/congo-united-
nations-european-union 
12
 Husarka, A. (2008) ‘Death watch’, Guardian Online, 30 
November, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/nov/30/congo
-unitednations  
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It is unsurprising then that, with violence increasing, 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 
updated its profile on the DRC to advise against 
travelling to the area.13 Yet those from the DRC 
who cannot amass enough evidence in their initial 
asylum claim face a stark choice between 
destitution or deportation. They are not alone. In 
the five years leading up to 2008, 77,000 people 
were refused asylum from countries that were 
described by the FCO as ‘major countries of 
concern’.14   
 
The politics of return 
 
So why does the government place such emphasis 
upon returning asylum seekers to areas that they 
simultaneously designate as unsafe for British 
nationals? After all, this is a practice that inevitably 
will, and does lead to accusations of hypocrisy and 
double standards. According to one refused asylum 
seeker, from the DRC, the answer lies within the 
fact that in the eyes of the government ‘I guess my 
life is worth nothing, and other peoples are worth 
something’.15 To this, however, we may add that 
programmes of return accentuate explicitly political 
priorities and rationales. The government was 
condemned by Amnesty International researchers 
in 2003 for example for forcibly returning asylum 
seekers to a volatile and unstable Afghanistan. And 
as these researchers suggested, they were 
concerned that deportations to the country were 
‘symbolic’.16 That is, returns policies may have 
been underpinned by a desire to portray the UK’s 
involvement in Afghanistan’s invasion in a positive 
light (by suggesting that the country was now safe 
to return to).  
 
Similar concerns can be raised in the context of the 
occupation of Iraq. The deportation of refused 
asylum seekers to the country has been universally 
condemned by a range of human rights groups and  
US based Human Rights Watch, for example, 
stated in 2005 that forced removals risked ‘violating 
a range of fundamental rights, including the right to 
 
 
                                                 
13See http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travelling-and-living-
overseas/travel-advice-by-country/sub-saharan-africa/congo-
democratic-republic  
14
 See Morris, I. (2008) ‘Britain closes door on 80, 000 asylum 
seekers’, Independent Online, 5 November, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/britain-
closes-door-on-80000-asylumseekers-992275.html   
15
 Interview with author, December 2008. 
16
 Amnesty International (2003) ‘UK/Afghanistan: Forced 
return of Afghan asylum-seekers unacceptable’, AI Index: 
ASA 11/012/2003, 28 April.  
 
 
life and liberty…’.17 But the continued expulsion of 
people to Iraq (albeit temporarily suspended for a 
short period), has been justified by a rhetoric that 
places significant emphasis on the reconstruction 
of the country. In 2003 - a year in which the 
organisation Iraq Body Count documented 12,047 
Iraqi civilian casualties as a result of violence in the 
country18 – the then Home Secretary David 
Blunkett stated that Iraq was ‘overwhelmingly safe’. 
Continuing to assert that refused Iraqi asylum 
seekers had a ‘moral obligation to return and assist 
in the rebuilding of the country’.19 Whilst at the end 
of 2008 the government offered Iraqi and Afghani 
asylum seekers extra ‘incentives’ to sign up to the 
IOM led Voluntary Assisted Return and 
Reintegration Programme (VARRP). On top of the 
£3,000 - £4,500 that is normally offered in return for 
leaving the country; up to £2,000 extra is available 
for those who agree to return home and help 
rebuild their shattered homelands.20  
 
But if the above suggests that attempts to return 
people are directly underpinned, in some cases at 
least, by the designs of foreign policy; they are at 
the same time shrouded by a desire, quite simply, 
to reduce the number of asylum seekers in the UK. 
Operating at the level of a debate over numbers, 
the New Labour government has set a series of 
targets ranging from the (already discussed) 
removal of refused asylum seekers, to a reduction 
in the amount of people applying for asylum in the 
first place.21 The mechanisms established in order 
to respond to those who cannot be returned exist 
within this wider context. 
  
 
                                                 
17
 Human Rights Watch (2005) ‘UK: Forced Return of 
Asylum-Seekers to Iraq’, HRW News, 18 August.  
18
 See http://www.iraqbodycount.org/database/  
19
 Cited in BBC (2003) ‘Iraqi refugees “deportation plan’”, 
BBC News, 24 November, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/uk_politics/3232222.stm  
20
 Corporate Watch (2008) ‘IOM introduces new “bribe” for 
refugees to return home’, Corporate Watch, 23 September, 
http://www.corporatewatch.org.uk/?lid=3140 As has been 
well documented, the reconstruction of Iraq has proved to be 
an extremely lucrative market for foreign contractors who 
seek to financially benefit from the occupation. See, for 
example, Klein, N. (2007) The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of 
Disaster Capitalism, London: Penguin. 
21
 See for example Home Office (2003) ‘Government Meets 
Target to halve Asylum Applications’, Home Office Press 
Release, 27 November, http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/press-
releases/Government_Meets_Target_To_Halve?version=1; 
and Home Office (2007) ‘Asylum figures lowest since 1993’,  
Home Office Press Release, 27 February, 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/about-us/news/asylum-quarter-
report   
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Mechanisms of return 
 
In order to facilitate the deportation of people who 
cannot, in normal circumstances, be removed, a 
framework has been established that attempts 
quite explicitly to ensure that a route home can be 
opened. This has taken on a number of guises. 
Memorandums of understanding, resting on 
diplomatic assurances that returnees will come to 
no harm, have been set up with a number of 
countries regarding the return of asylum seekers 
and in 2005 for example the British government 
made such an arrangement with the Interim Iraqi 
Government. This particular MOU, which did not 
apply to women and children, was not made 
available to the public. And questions about its 
validity were raised by leaked documents 
emphasising government fears that relatively few 
people would be able to be removed after the legal 
challenges that they expected.22  
 
But it is exactly these legal challenges which 
suggest that returning people to Iraq would not 
have been safe. It is a breach of Article 3 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights if an 
individual is deported somewhere where they are 
knowingly going to be tortured.23 Thus MOUs are 
used to try and go some way in absolving the 
deporting state of responsibility (legally, if not 
morally) for removing an individual. But the very 
fact that governments attempt to reach diplomatic 
agreements that returnees won’t be ill treated 
merely acknowledges awareness that this ill-
treatment is a distinct possibility. And it is for this 
reason that Human Rights Watch has commented 
they are, ‘tacit admissions that torture is 
practiced’.24  In Somalia, for example, a confidential 
MOU has been in operation for an undisclosed 
number of years regarding the return of refused 
asylum seekers.25 
 
This MOU is between the New Labour government, 
                                                 
22
 Travis, A. (2005) ‘Asylum leak reveals only 20 Iraqis will 
be sent back’, Guardian Online,6 October, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/oct/06/iraq.immigration  
23
 It is important to note here though that the UK government 
has attempted to revise this principal, see Joint Committee on 
Human Rights (2006) ‘The prohibition on torture - Nineteenth 
report, London: House of Lords and House of Commons. 
24
 Human Rights Watch (2006) ‘U.K.-Algeria Deal to Deport 
Suspects is Fig-Leaf for Torture’, News Release, 7 March, 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2006/03/07/uk-algeria-deal-
deport-suspects-fig-leaf-torture  
25
 Home Office (2008) Operational Guidance Note – Somalia, 
London: Home Office. It is important to note, however, that 
even with an MOU removals to Somalia have proved difficult 
for the Home Office to administer. 
 
 
and the Somalian authorities, and sets out the 
grounds for returns to a number of airports: one of 
which is in the capital, Mogadishu. Responding to 
explicit claims by the UNHCR that Somalians’ 
should not be returned to the Southern or Central 
areas of the country (Mogadishu is in the South), 
the Home Office responded, quite bluntly, by 
stating that they did not accept this conclusion.26  
 
As discussed earlier, a number of countries which 
are well known to be instable have been the 
subject of legal battling between the government 
and the judiciary for years; as the former attempts 
to establish that refused asylum seekers can be 
returned with no risk. A crucial factor within these 
debates can be broad analyses of countries’ 
general human rights and political situations and a 
number of organisations and bodies produce 
overviews of country information including Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch, and the 
Electronic Immigration Network. These are used 
within claims for asylum to provide contextual 
information, and offer insight into specific areas of 
concern. Because of their importance and relative 
influence in asylum policy, the Home Office 
consequently produces its own country information 
which is utilised by those who make decisions on 
an asylum claim. The Country of Origin Information 
Service is described by the Home Office as 
providing ‘accurate, objective, up-to-date, sourced 
information on asylum seekers’ countries of 
origin’.27 Yet it has been claimed that these 
documents are partisan, biased, and poorly 
researched. In a damning report in 2004 by the 
Immigration Advisory Service, Home Office country 
reports were derided as displaying a lack of 
objectivity, based on poor research methods, and 
ultimately downplaying human rights abuses in 
certain countries.28 The inference was that the 
information produced by the Home Office was 
underpinned by a desire to ‘try drive down the 
numbers of successful asylum applications and 
appeals’.29   
 
Put within the context of this paper, Home Office 
country reports can thus be viewed as one part of a 
wider machinery of removal. Yet, regardless of 
                                                 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Home Office (undated) Country of origin information 
service, 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/country_reports.html   
28
 Immigration Advisory Service (2004) ‘Lack of Objectivity 
in Home Office Country Reports’, IAS Press Release, 6 
September, 
http://www.iasuk.org/C2B/PressOffice/display.asp?ID=194&
Type=2&Search=true  
29
 Ibid. 
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overviews of human rights situations the UK 
government can still effect removals through its 
relationship with the IOM. As discussed earlier the 
IOM runs a voluntary assisted returns programme 
that supports people to go back to their country of 
origin, sometimes underpinned by financial 
incentives. Furthermore, if an individual accepts to 
return voluntarily then they can access Section 4 
support – a combination of £35 per week in food 
vouchers and temporary accommodation. Section 4 
Support has been subjected to fierce criticism, and 
it is not necessary to go over these in detail here.30 
However, it is worth reiterating the argument that 
offering support on the provision that a person 
leaves the country can be inherently coercive; 
particularly when a person may be homeless and 
agreeing to return home because this has become 
simply too much to bear. And this coercion 
becomes all the more questionable when the 
returnee is made to sign a declaration stating that 
their decision is made ‘after due consideration and 
entirely of my own free will’.31 
 
The IOM has a further crucial role, however, in 
providing evidence where a ‘voluntary’ return 
cannot be achieved due to a lack of safe routes 
into a country. If an individual has agreed to be 
assisted home by the IOM, but the organisation 
cannot organise the flight,32 then theoretically the 
person should be entitled to some form of support. 
Yet it is not normal practice for IOM to put in writing 
where they cannot assist an individual.33 Where 
this is the case people can be forced into 
destitution because the Home Office has assumed 
that the individual is not making any attempts to 
leave the country.34 As in other contexts destitution 
– or the threat of destitution – underpins policies of 
removal of those who have had their asylum claims 
rejected.   
                                                 
30
 Although see for example Burnett, J. (2007) ‘Section 4 
Support’, PAFRAS Briefing Paper No. 1, Leeds: PAFRAS; 
and Doyle, L. (2008) More Token Gestures, London: The 
Refugee Council. 
31
 Voluntary Assisted Return and Reintegration Programme. 
(Undated) Declaration of Voluntary Return, London: 
International Organisation for Migration. 
32
 The IOM may not be able to return an individual because, 
for example, there is no safe route of return or travel 
documents cannot be obtained. 
33
 The difficulties of obtaining correct travel documents are 
discussed in more detail in Hickey, G. (2008) Unreasonably 
destitute? How UKBA is failing to support refused asylum 
seekers unable to leave the UK through no fault of their own, 
London: ASAP.  
34
 If a person receives Section 4 support on the basis that they 
are returning home, but are not perceived to be making the 
necessary arrangements (such as obtaining travel documents 
for example) then this support will be terminated.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
A framework of powers, policies, and directives is 
being built up that seeks explicitly to ensure that 
refused asylum seekers can be removed from the 
country even where the law argues against such 
removals from taking place. It is made up of a 
range of techniques and practices that, when taken 
together, indicate that the government is prepared 
to go to extraordinary lengths to enable the 
removal of asylum seekers even to countries which 
are considered across the world as dangerous, 
volatile, and unstable. We do not know how 
effective these policies have been. The number of 
people that have been removed under the terms of 
MOUs between the UK and other countries, for 
example, is unknown. And we certainly do not 
know what has happened to people on their return. 
But as Fekete has argued deportees include:35  
 
Aids victims (who will die for lack of treatment in 
their home countries), homosexuals fleeing 
persecution, Roma escaping racial violence, girls 
who have been trafficked into sex slavery and the 
female victims of genital mutilation. 
 
What is clear is that policies of removal reflect a 
range of concerns, of which the human rights of 
those who have sought asylum appear to be low 
down in the list of priorities. The very fact that so 
much resources and efforts are put into legal 
battles, providing country information suggesting 
repressive states are ‘safe’, establishing deals with 
governments that are known to be dangerous, and 
attempting to cajole people to leave the country of 
their own accord indicates that the government is 
adamant in its attempts to remove people even 
where there is no direction home. Underpinned by 
destitution, this constitutes a framework that is 
buttressed by coercion, misinformation, and 
political manoeuvring.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35
 Fekete, L. (2005) ‘The deportation machine: unmonitored 
and unimpeded’, IRR News Online, 9 April, 
http://www.irr.org.uk/2005/april/ha000011.html  
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